Opt-out pensions pose many difficult design and implementation issues. The U.K. experience suggests several valuable lessons for U.S. policymakers. First, complex interactions between public and opt-out pensions may create confusion among workers, leading to both discontent and demands for policy change. Second, allowing recurrent opportunities to opt into and out of individual accounts increases administrative complexity, increases choice complexity for workers, and may undermine system legitimacy-but it may also be politically unavoidable. Third, the market may not, unprompted, provide personal pension vehicles that are appropriate retirement savings vehicles for low-earners, especially those who have interrupted earnings records. Fourth, price indexation of wage histories may create pressures for ad hoc policy change. Fifth, increased reliance on means-tested pensions increases administrative complexity and creates perverse incentives for savings and for types of assets held, especially where assets as well as income-tests are involved. Sixth, an option for quasi-privatized pensions leads to pressures to treat those pensions more like fully private pensions with respect to flexibility in withdrawals, inheritability, and ability to borrow against fund balances. Seventh, annuitization costs can add significantly to pension system costs and inequality across cohorts, so the state may want to take on the role of monopoly annuity provider. Eighth, scandals and failures drive policymakers and consumer responses, so it is important to get the policy design right the first time and invest heavily in public understanding of how the reform will work. A final lesson is that scandals, policy tinkering, and uncertainty over pension policy may affect workers' propensity to opt out of state pensions in unpredictable ways-not just driving people to exit from the state system.
Introduction
The public pension system in the United Kingdom is distinctive among the advanced industrial countries in several ways. One is the unusual relationship between the state and private pension sectors. The U.K. has a quasi-universal flat-rate state pension. On top of this basic pension is an earnings-related pension tier in which private providers operate in parallel with (as an opt out from) the state system rather than as an additional tier. Second, as a result of widespread opting-out, the U.K. ranks very low among OECD countries both in terms of current pension expenditures and its anticipated long-term pension expenditure burden. A third characteristic of British pensions is frequent tinkering with public pensions, especially rules governing the interaction between the state earnings-related pension and private alternatives. A fourth critical dimension of British pension policy is a prolonged pattern of what Jacob Hacker has called "policy drift" in private occupational pensions away from defined benefit to defined contribution principles.
1 A fifth and final characteristic of British pension policy is the very high level of seniors who are eligible for means-tested pensions.
The purpose of this paper is to draw out lessons from the U.K. experience for the United States, with a particular emphasis on design and implementation of a parallel "partial opt-out" pension system. While different programmatic histories and political environments mean that few lessons (either positive or negative) can be directly transferred from one country to the other, the British experience does suggest a number of cautions and opportunities for U.S. policymakers.
I argue in the paper that in addition to the usual demographic and fiscal pressures facing most of the advanced industrial countries, two distinctive forces have driven pension politics in the United Kingdom. First is the policy legacy of a very late movein the 1960s and 1970s-to a public earnings-related pension system. In a classic example of path dependence, the new earnings-related pension system was created to fit alongside, rather than pre-empting or supplanting, a very large pre-existing private (both occupational and personal) pension sector. The late development of state earningsrelated pensions had the simultaneous effects of (1) lowering the overall costs of the public pension system, (2) making issues concerning low-income recipients far more visible, and making it more difficult to hide cross-subsidies from upper to lower income groups within a broader pension system, and (3) creating persistent problems with how to integrate the public and private earnings-related schemes and how much (if at all) to allow switching back and forth between those systems.
Second, the long period of Conservative political hegemony under Margaret
Thatcher and John Major reinforced persistent pressures to keep government expenditures down in ways that changed the character of pension options and discourse, enhancing the attractiveness of privatized pensions for the "New Labour" government since 1997.
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Most continental European countries face a very severe deterioration in their ratio of individuals of working age to those aged 65 plus in coming years. The situation in the United Kingdom is somewhat less dramatic, with the ratio of those aged 65 plus to those aged 20-64 likely to rise from a little under 30 percent in the year 2000 to almost 50 percent in 2050. While a falling youth dependency ratio (due to fertility rates that are well below replacement) will lower the total (youth plus 65+) dependency ratio somewhat, it is still expected to increase from a historical low in the first decade of the 21st Century (under 70 percent) to about 85 percent by 2040.
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Like most other West European countries, the U.K also has relatively low rates of labor market participation by older workers. Almost a third of men and a slightly higher percentage of women between the ages of 50 and the standard pensionable age are not employed. 3 Early labor market withdrawal is especially prevalent among women, who have historically been able to collect a full state pension at age 60 (this will be equalized with the state pension age for men between 2010 and 2020, as will be discussed below). suggest that this combination of electoral rules and weak inter-branch and inter-chamber checks and balances is likely to give rise to a political dynamic in which (1) two large political parties dominate national politics, (2) those parties generally pursue policies close to the preference of median voters, (3) one of the two major parties generally holds power in single-party majority governments despite winning only a plurality of the popular vote, (4) the two major parties alternate in power with some regularity, but (5) occasional major swings in policy are possible after elections when the two parties have deviated from the preferences of median voters. Unlike what such theories suggest, however, the two big parties in the party system have not persistently hugged the center of the political spectrum, seeking to become virtually ideology-less "catch-all" parties slavishly pursuing the median voter.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
There is some truth to such a characterization in the first decades of the post-war-period:
it even had a label, "Butskellism" (a combination of the surnames of successive Labour Fortunately for the Conservatives, Labour was extremely accommodating in this regard through the mid-1980s.
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As a result, the U.K. did not experience regular alternations in power in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Divisions within the center and left parties gave the Conservatives an uninterrupted 18 year run in power from 1979 to 1997 while never winning more than 44 percent of the popular vote. The absence of party change in government lowered the risk that pension policy would be subject to frequent reversals of direction, while Labour's weakness lowered the risk that the Conservatives would have to engage in pension "bidding wars" at election time. Equally important, Conservative dominance meant that the Thatcher government's stress on an increased role for private pension provision had an opportunity to become fully institutionalized and build up a strong support constituency among both pension providers and holders of privatized pensions. By the time that a chastened Labour Party-"or New Labour" as Prime
Minister Tony Blair likes to call it-came back into power with a smashing victory in 1997, it was firmly pursuing a centrist line, and had adopted many Thatcherite positions, including acceptance of a greater role for private rather than state-provided pensions. But while the U.K. avoided major reversals in policy direction after the mid 1980s, the absence of veto points characteristic of the Westminster parliamentary system also meant that single-party majority governments could engage in frequent tinkering at the margins to address perceived shortcomings in the pension system. As we will see below, frequent tinkering with pensions has characterized both the Thatcher and Blair eras-a major difference from the United States, where have been hardly any significant changes in Social Security legislation since 1983.
THE PENSION POLICY ENVIRONMENT
As in other countries, pension politics in the U.K., and in particular the Politics, vol. 18, no. 4 (October 1995) pp. 150-169.
prices. 16 As we will see later, however, SERPS has been repeatedly altered-and recently renamed and reconstituted-since its introduction.
Another central policy legacy in the British pension system has been the absence of a truly dedicated payroll tax mechanism for pensions. While the British National Insurance scheme has always had separate National Insurance contributions, there has always been a Treasury contribution to National Insurance benefits, and the British Treasury has consistently viewed a real earmarking of dedicated taxes as anathema because it interferes with their capacity to manage overall government expenditures.
Moreover, contrary to Beveridge's desire for a system of advanced funding, Basic
Pension benefits under the 1946 Act were paid out immediately. As a result, (1) there was a weak link between both overall and individual contributions and benefits; and (2) no tradition of advanced funding of pensions in a dedicated fund (not even a fund consisting of IOUs in the form of government securities) ever developed in the U.K.
A third key legacy of the low level of publicly provided pension benefits in the U.K. was the strong emergence of occupational pensions. Occupational schemes covered about 37 percent of the workforce by 1956 and 49 percent of the labor force thereafter-a figure that remained relatively steady at around half of the labor force for the next twenty years. 17 Pension providers, in turn, developed into a substantial force that would have to be accommodated in later reforms that aimed to provide an earnings-related pension. the U.K., occupational pensions became an alternative to SERPS. Occupational pensions that met specified criteria were allowed to "opt out" of SERPS, receiving a rebate of part of National Insurance contributions that would be used to support the occupational pension scheme. In the original program rules, only "final salary schemes"-occupational pensions that provided a defined benefit-with benefits roughly equivalent to those under SERPS, were allowed to contract out. But the government provided an inflation protection guarantee for contracted-out occupational pensions as well as SERPS pensions.
Opt-out provisions for SERPS had a number of important consequences for the program. On the fiscal side, contracting out meant that state pension obligations in the U.K. would be far lower than in many other countries. Indeed, public pension expenditures in the U.K. are actually expected to decline as a percentage of GDP from an already relatively low 5.5 percent of GDP in 2000 to 4.4 percent by 2050-less than one third the level projected for many West European countries.
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Allowing an opt-out from the second tier of the state pension system also created a number of recurring policy issues for the program, however. How much of a rebate should contracted-out pension plans receive from National Insurance contributions, for example? How could occupational pensions be offered in a way that did not (1) Finally, the extremely complex pension system in the U.K. also had led to relatively high levels of senior poverty and levels of income inequality among British seniors in comparison to most other wealthy OECD countries. In particular, the shift from indexing the basic State Pension by the higher of wage and price growth to indexing by inflation instituted early in Margaret Thatcher's period in power (and discussed further below) meant that those dependent primarily on the flat-rate pension fell increasingly behind wage earners.
Growing concern over senior poverty, in turn, has had a major impact on the British pension agenda in recent years. Since the advent of the Blair government in 1997, government has struggled with the question of whether it is best to address senior poverty through a more generous Basic State pension, a restructured SERPS, an income-tested program, or changes to private pensions that make them a better deal for low-wage earners and those who spend a large part of their adult lives as caregivers.
THE INTEREST GROUP ENVIRONMENT
Interest group activity on pensions in the U.K. has been heavily influenced by the policy legacy of a heavily privatized pension system that operates parallel to and in partial competition with state pensions rather than as a supplement to them. In most OECD countries, pension politics has generally pitted trade unions and (more recently) seniors organizations against rather more diffuse business interests opposed to higher payroll taxes. The complex British pension system has given rise to an equally complex set of interest groups, in which the interests of provider organizations have generally had more influence than trade unions, and organizations of pensioners have had difficulty speaking with a single voice.
A number of organizations focused on concerns of the aged do exist in the U.K. 
PENSION POLICYMAKING SINCE 1980
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government came to power in 1979 with a strong determination both to reduce state expenditures and to roll back the role of the state more generally. As noted above, the Thatcher government's initial move, in 1980, was to change the standard for indexing the basic state pension, from the higher of wages and prices to simply prices. This allowed the government to claim, correctly, that they were preserving the real purchasing power of benefits while cutting the role of the Basic Pension substantially over time.
The Social Security Review and Personal Pensions
The Lawson and Fowler. 24 The Green Paper also sought to counter the argument that SERPS provided a needed degree of certainty in pensions after prolonged debate by arguing that the Labour Party's proposal for investing pension funds into a National Investment Bank would upset that
The Green Paper proposed a radical solution for SERPS: rather than simply reducing benefits, the program was to be phased out over a three year period for men under age 50 and women under age 45 (older workers would remain in the current system). Current entitlements earned under SERPS would be honored (with enhanced credits for those in a transitional ten-year age cohort), but younger workers were expected to enter either into occupational pensions or new "personal pensions" that were expected to be offered by insurance companies, building and friendly societies and other providers.
Occupational pensions were to be encouraged by allowing employers to offer "money purchase" (funded defined contribution) pensions rather than "the open-ended promise of a defined benefit scheme." 25 Some hot issues, like raising the retirement age (or equalizing it for men and women) were dodged in the Green Paper. Others questions, such as whether annuity providers would be expected to provide pensions on a genderneutral basis (contrary to then-existing practice) in the new system were left open for future discussion.
Not surprisingly, the Green Paper proposals proved to be highly controversial, and the pension provisions especially so. Powerful interests, including the Confederation Overall, the cuts were expected to cut SERPS payments through the year 2035 roughly in half.
For occupational pension funds, there was mixed news. On the one hand, they only had to meet the new, lower twenty percent standards for pension benefits.
Employers were also offered the opportunity to offer their pensions on a defined contribution rather than defined benefit basis. But under the new law they, rather than the state, would be responsible for the first three percent of price inflation for pensions once they began to be paid. Workers who changed jobs after less than five years also The most dramatic innovation, though was the introduction of "personal pensions" on a defined contribution basis available to everyone-those whose employers offered occupational pensions as well as those who did not.
Reforms Under Major
Further pension reforms under John Major, who succeeded Margaret Thatcher as prime minister after a cabinet rebellion in 1992, largely continued the direction of reforms under Thatcher. The 1995 Pension Act set in place a prolonged timetable for equalization of the standard retirement age. It also made further savings in SERPS.
In the leadup to the 1997 general election, which it was expected to lose by a landslide, the Major government, desperate to come up with a bold idea that could turn around its failing fortunes, proposed a change even more dramatic than those proposed by Second, SERPS was to be phased out (although accrued benefit entitlements would remain in place) and replaced with a new State Second Pension (S2P), targeted on low-earners. It would provide higher benefits for low-wage earners: those who made above the Lower Earnings Level at which National Insurance contributions start to be made would be credited with earnings of ₤9,000 for purposes of the S2P. Moreover, qualifying caregivers (those caring for children under age 6 and for invalids) and persons who had inconsistent labor market participation as a result of disability would also be credited with S2P contributions. Persons who contracted out of the S2P would receive contribution rebates and top-ups intended to make them no worse off than if they had stayed in the state system. The most dramatic change from SERPS, however, was that a few years after its introduction, S2P benefit accruals were to become flat-rate rather than earnings-related: this was intended to provide a strong incentive for workers earning significantly more than ₤9,500 per year to contract out of the S2P. Overall, the State Second Pension was expected to provide substantially higher benefits to low-income workers when they retired. The Department of Social Security estimated that the percentage of retirees qualifying for the Minimum Income Guarantee would be lowered from one in three to one in five by the S2P. Net costs to the Treasury (taking account of lower means-tested benefits payable) were estimated at ₤0.3 billion in 2010, rising to ₤4.4 billion by 2050.
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The third component of the government's proposals was labeled "stakeholder pensions." It was intended to deal with the problems of high (and frequently frontloaded and/or obscure) charges on personal pensions that made them a poor retirement savings vehicle for persons of modest earnings, and made moving savings from one fund to another even more problematic. 33 Like personal pensions (and unlike SERPS and S2P), stakeholder pensions were to be defined contribution rather than defined benefit schemes provided by the private sector. But management fees were to be more heavily regulated: they were to be set as a percentage of the value of a person's total assets in the fund, and could not exceed one percent of those assets per annum. To encourage low-earners to contribute, stakeholder funds were required to accept contributions as low as ₤10, and could not penalize fund members for failing to make minimum (or making no contributions) for some period. Moreover, fund members could transfer their stakeholder pension to another fund without charge. Most employers, including small employers, would be required to designate a stakeholder fund to which employees could make contributions. Contributions of up to ₤3,600 per year could be made to stakeholders on a person's behalf regardless of their earnings. Earnings on stakeholder pensions were to be tax-free; taxes were to be paid at normal rates on withdrawals, except for a lump sum up to a maximum of 25 percent the value of the fund at the time of retirement. All of these provisions were designed to make stakeholders more appropriate for lower income workers, while creating a product image that was more positive than that associated with personal pensions, which had been severely damaged by the misselling scandal of the late 1980s.
While the Blair government's reforms did indeed increase incomes for the poorest pensioners, many in the party felt that they did not go far enough. In particular, increases in the Minimum Income Guarantee, and a pledge that it would be uprated with earnings, the Department had continued to publish incorrect information that led widows to think that they would continue to inherit their husband's entire SERPS benefit. Once again, the government's initial (cost-saving) reaction was far from sure-footed, promising only to delay the change for 30 months, and to provide compensation to widows who could show that they were "actively misled" by government officials rather than simply ignorant of it.
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By late 2002, the Blair government was claiming that its reforms had made the average pensioner household "£1,150 a year better off in real terms, compared with 1997," with those gains concentrated among lower income pensioners, and that there had been significant reductions in senior poverty under New Labour. 35 In the press, however, there was increasing talk of a U.K. "pensions crisis," with several elements. One of the most alarming trends was an increasing tendency for employers operating defined benefit pension plans to close those plans to new employees, and sometimes to existing employees as well. These plans were replaced with defined contribution pensions, usually with a substantial cut in employer contributions. These plan closures were at least in part a result of the Blair government's decision to introduce an insurance scheme for employer plans, which will increase the costs of such plans to employers.
The new stakeholder pension has also largely failed to achieve its objective of providing a cheap accessible retirement savings product for women and low-income families. Overall levels of stakeholder sales have been disappointing, and most of those sold have in fact been purchased by higher income families, who are more likely to be able to afford them and who are more likely to be targeted in marketing by the firms providing them. 36 These disappointing sales figures may also reflect conflicting advice presented in the media by industry experts about whether it makes sense for low-earners to save in pensions or more flexible savings tax-advantaged savings instruments. The argument against saving in stakeholders is that (1) other savings vehicles, notably ISAs provide greater flexibility on withdrawals and don't have annual fees, (2) lowearners are unlikely to be able to take full advantage of the tax advantages on deposits to stakeholder accounts, and (3) they are unlikely to have a retirement income above the minimum income guarantee, and thus will be subject to high tax rates on any retirement savings they do accrue. For a good example of conflicting arguments by pension experts in the media, see Tony Hazell, "Pensions Chaos Too Confusing," Daily Mail, March 19, 2003, p. 54. lose 60 pence for every pound of retirement income rather than 100 under the prior system There are other threats on the horizon as well. At least one U.K. life insurance company has announced that it may in the future move to a system of awarding differential annuities based on the residential postal code of new annuitants, in recognition of the fact that residents in wealthy areas are likely, on average, to live longer than those in poorer areas. 41 This policy cannot be applied to the part of an individual's "pension pot" that is financed through rebates from National Insurance contributions.
And it remains to be seen whether it will be actually implemented-and if it is implemented, whether those in wealthier postal codes will develop successful strategies to evade it. But it adds further to an already widespread feeling of unease about the pension system.
During its second term, the Blair government proposed several further reforms to address these shortcomings in pension policy. In December 2002, the government issued yet another pensions Green Paper that proposed scrapping the confusing current array of eight different schemes for tax-advantaged retirement savings and replacing them with a single lifetime limit for tax-advantaged pension savings accruals. The Green paper also proposed greater retirement age flexibility, but no changes to the fundamental publicprivate pensions mix in the U.K or an increase in the retirement age above 65. 42 Another Green paper in June 2003 focused on the crisis in defined-benefit occupational pensions.
It proposed a pension insurance fund for underfunded schemes of insolvent employers, modeled after the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in the United States, and funded by employer contributions. The Green Paper also proposed measures to make it harder for solvent employers to avoid their pension obligations by closing down their DB pension schemes, lessened the requirements of such schemes to provide inflation protection for retirees, and proposed a new, more pro-active regulator for such funds. Two major features stand out about the nature of policy change in the U.K. First, the degree of reform has been stunning. Second, reform has been frequent, with major pension reforms in 1980, 1986, 1996, and 2000. There also several striking patterns in outcomes. First, the U.K systems is extraordinarily complex-and confusing. Second, the public component of the pension system-and especially its income-related component-has been increasingly marginalized, a pattern that began under Margaret Thatcher and has continued under Tony Blair. But there has also been an increased reliance on means-tested pensions under Blair.
Explanations
Britain has made by far the most dramatic pension policy changes of all the countries considered here over the past two decades, moving to a system in which private pensions have been given an enhanced role, and public pensions have been marginalized and repeatedly altered, although not abolished. How can this pattern be explained?
Clearly it cannot be solely explained by either demographic or fiscal crisis. Britain has one of the lowest current and projected public pension liabilities among the OECD countries. Three major features stand out as key in explaining these outcomes: policy inheritances or "path dependence" from prior policy choices, a Westminster-style parliamentary system that concentrated power to the governing party, and a party system that in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave the governing Conservative Party limited fear of electoral retribution as it enacted a series of controversial policies.
It is very doubtful that policy changes-and benefit cuts under Thatcher--of the magnitude of those seen in the U.K. could have been enacted without Britain's Westminster style parliamentary institutions, which give governments with a plurality of the vote parliamentary majorities, and those elected with a near-majority of the vote huge majorities of parliamentary seats. Westminster institutions alone are not an adequate explanation of this phenomenon, however. In New Zealand, bold retrenchment after elections was usually preceded by competition for elderly votes during election periods and followed by policy reversals prior to the next election. In Canada, the Mulroney government was cautious in enacting pension retrenchment even after its sweeping
Parliamentary victory in 1984, and never attempted anything as bold as the reforms that have occurred in the U.K.
In both Canada and New Zealand, party competition was much closer than it has been in the U. in none of these elections were appeals for senior votes seen as keys to an electoral victory that otherwise might slip away. And in both 1992 and 1997, Labour was reluctant to make pledges that could be seen as fiscally irresponsible for fear that it would bring back visions of "Old Labour" that Margaret Thatcher (with the help of the Labour left) had so successfully demonized. In short, Westminster institutions created an institutional opportunity for policy restructuring by giving the Thatcher government the capacity to enact such change, but the lack of effective political competition was also critical by (1) allowing a government to take office which was far from the preferences of median voters, and (2) giving the Thatcher government the political will to enact major changes without major concern over the political consequences.
When a chastened Labour Party returned to power after eighteen years in 1997, they were compelled to operate within a policy and political world that was very much of the Conservatives' making. Personal pensions were well-established, and popular with 
Challenges and Choices
Developing a report card for the British pension system is an exercise in extremes.
On some measures, it stands out as superior to most or all in the club of rich OECD countries. In other respects, it can only be regarded as a dismal failure, reflecting trade- 46 Rawnsley, Servants of the People, p. 120 offs inherent in a set of choices that is both unusual and extreme the role given to private pension providers.
In terms of pension adequacy-provision of a minimum floor that is broadly available and effective in alleviating poverty, particularly with respect to vulnerable groups such as widows and those who spent long times in unpaid caregiving, the British system until recently had a poor record, with high rates of relative and absolute poverty.
Here the Blair reforms to means-tested pensions have in fact made an important difference for low-income pensioners, although low-rates of take-up, especially among lowest-income pensioners and minorities mean that it still has a mediocre record. The In addition, the U.K pension system earns very poor marks for riskiness. Indeed, what is remarkable about the U.K. pension system is the range of risks to which British pensioners have been exposed. Together the high degree of privatization in the British pension system and the volatility of pension policy have given rise not only to familiar financial market risks (risks that pensions will be affected by falling financial markets), but also employer-specific risks (that an employer will go bankrupt, leaving behind an under-funded pension fund), annuitization risks (shifts in annuity prices over time), and political risks (risks that government will renege on explicit or implicit promises it has made to present and future pensioners). Finally, as noted above, U.K. pensioners may also in the future face what might be called "financial industry practice risks"-risks that changing financial industry practices such as annuity prices varying by postal codes might result in a different pension than anticipated after an individual has already made a long term commitment to build a pension through a defined contribution pension rather than remaining in the state defined benefit system. These risks are felt to different degrees by employees who make different choices about where to entrust their provision for retirement. Moreover, several of the risks have been poorly conveyed to workers. This is particularly true of the risk of pension losses caused by firm insolvency leaving behind an underfunded pension fund. As British pension expert Ros Altman has noted, "workers have been hoodwinked into thinking the best thing they could do was contribute loyally and regularly to their employer's pension scheme… [without] any warning they could lose the lot."
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The pension system in the United Kingdom also earns low marks for administrative effectiveness and efficiency. Britain's high-cost retail method of marketing personal pensions and annuities, the extension of recurrent means-testing to a majority of seniors through the Pension Credit, and the low take-up rates for means-tested benefits, especially among the most disadvantaged seniors are all indicators of a pension system that has serious problems in meeting its objectives.
Despite the recent spate of changes under the Blair government, many critical challenges remain. A central challenge for British pension policy as it faces the future is to create a sensible, intelligible set of investment choices for individuals. The current array of pension products is so confusing that most contributors cannot understand the choice of options that is confronting them, let alone make the most appropriate choice among those options. A second central challenge for the U.K. is how to develop a pension system that provides an adequate pension to low-wage earners and those (disproportionately women) who have spent little time in the paid labor force without removing savings incentives.
Lessons for the United States
The U.K. experience shows that designing and implementing a partial opt-out from a public pension system is an extremely complex task. First, the U.K. experience suggests that complex interactions between public and opt-out pensions create confusion among workers, leading to both discontent and demands for policy change. This is particularly evident in the British case, and stems from the differing ways that entitlement to benefits is earned in defined benefit and defined contribution systems. Contributions made to a defined contribution tier earlier in one's working life are likely to garner a higher eventual annuitized pension value than those made shortly before retirement, because they have a longer time to accrue capital gains, dividends or interest. Contributions to a defined benefit plan, on the other hand, are generally indexed for wage growth, so that returns on contributions of equal real value are likely to provide relatively equal returns whether made early or late in a worker's career. Thus it is likely that many workers would find it advantageous to opt back in to a state defined benefit plan at some point if they are allowed to do so. For most workers, however, it is unclear where that point is.
It is possible to address this problem, as in the U.K., by increasing the National Insurance rebate for older workers, gives them greater incentives to opt out, but makes the system more complicated, and more opaque. Moreover, it makes much less sense to A second and related lesson suggested by British experience is that a pension system that allows recurrent opt-ins and opt-outs from the state system may lead both to increased complexity for administrators and pension savers and to potential legitimacy problems for the entire system. A different alternative, requiring young workers to make a one-time irrevocable choice to opt-out or opt-in from OASI, that they would have to live with for forty years or more, is probably not appropriate, and almost certainly not politically sustainable in the U.S. context. Even if workers who had opted out were provided an investment option that essentially allowed them to guard against further perceived losses while staying in the individual account system, it is unlikely that this alternative would be politically sufficient.
A third lesson is that the market may not, unprompted, provide personal pension vehicles that are appropriate retirement savings vehicles for low-earners, especially those who have interrupted earnings records. The problem of making appropriate choices in opting out of a state pension system is likely to be particularly acute in the United States,
given the very high returns on contributions of low-wage workers under Social Security.
Workers who are encouraged to opt-out inappropriately by government could cause an even greater political uproar than the pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom.
A fourth lesson is that price indexation of wage histories is likely to create pressures for ad hoc policy change. This is particularly true if, as has been suggested, price indexing would involve a stable purchasing power for benefits over time relative to the wage of average workers. This flat real benefit would be "earned" by earnings that are increasing in real terms over time-in other words, it would comprise a very large decrease in Social Security replacement rates. 48 In the U.K., a huge decline in the purchasing power of the Basic State Pension relative to average wages has in the Blair years been addressed primarily by the expansion of means-tested benefits combined with an expansion of credits for retirement savings. But it is far from clear that this will be politically sustainable; as noted above, this strategy has come under widespread criticism and may not be politically sustainable much longer. The political risk of such a proposal is that it would open up a Social Security system that has been almost immune from changes over the past twenty years to a renewal of the bidding wars that characterized Social Security policymaking in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Fifth, increased reliance on means-tested pensions increases administrative complexity and creates perverse incentives for savings and for types of assets held, especially where assets as well as income-tests are involved. While increased reliance on means-testing is not part of most of the proposals currently being discussed in the United
States, the discussion above suggests that it could arise over time if replacement rates for Social Security fell as part of a Social Security reform package.
Sixth, providing an opportunity for a partial opt-out into individual investment accounts is likely to lead to pressures to treat those pensions more like fully private pensions with respect to flexibility in withdrawals, inheritability, and ability to borrow against fund balances. In the case of current proposals being circulated in the United States, the biggest issues are likely to arise with respect to inheritability of benefits. If individual account balances were to be partially offset at retirement by amounts that reflect Social Security benefits foregone, for example, inheritable balances would be far lower than account holders and their survivors expect. Early retirees would likely demand that they have access to Social Security individual account balances at the same times as IRAs. The devil will be in the details of interaction of Social Security benefits and individual account balances and in the way that account balances are presented to account holders. But it will also be in a new political dynamic created by individual accounts-and in the desire of legislators to be responsive to the new demands that an individual account system would prompt in recipients.
Seventh, annuitization costs can add significantly to pension system costs and inequality across cohorts, so the state may want to take on the role of monopoly annuity provider. Again, this lesson appears to have been absorbed in early proposals from the Bush administration. British experience suggests that it is important to retain this element of current proposals as debates on Social Security reform continue.
An eighth lesson from the British experience is that scandals and policy failures help to drive policymaking. Politicians respond to scandals-although not always in the most appropriate ways-because the public expects them to bring the perpetrators of unacceptable actions to account, to mitigate the consequences of such actions, and to prevent a repeat of those actions. The Major and Blair governments have had to respond to three major scandals: the pension mis-selling scandal of the late 1980s, the Maxwell occupational pensions scandal, and the failure of DSS to publicize changed policies on widows' inheritance of SERPS benefits. There is little doubt that given the incentives of credit-claiming and blame-avoiding politicians in the decentralized policymaking process in the United States, scandal-driven policymaking would be at least as important in the United States. Thus it is important to get the policy design right the first time, to take substantial time to get implementation mechanisms in place, and to invest heavily in public understanding of how the reform will work to lessen the possibility that public misunderstandings will lead to backlash and tireless tinkering with policy-which in turn would risk further public misunderstandings.
A final lesson is that scandals, policy tinkering, and uncertainty over pension policy may affect workers' propensity to opt out of state pensions in unpredictable ways.
We might expect that uncertainty over state pension policy-especially when it involves tinkering in which the overall trend is toward retrenchment--would lead to a loss of confidence in and exit from the state system when exit is allowed as an option. A key perceived advantage of a state pension is that it is secure rather than risky. If workers are
(1) confused about the relative advantages of public and private options by repeated changes in the public system, and/or (2) no more sure about the fate that their pension is likely to suffer at the hands of future politicians than they are about the returns on investments in the markets, they are presumably more likely to opt for individual account options when they are given a choice. But the U.K. experience does not provide strong evidence for this view. Indeed, the overall trend between 1991/2 and 2000/1 was for increased participation in SERPS-up from 31 to 38 percent of workers, while the percentage with personal pensions stagnated at 28 percent.
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Overall, the U.K. experience suggests that the issues confronted in designing and implementing opt-out pensions are quite daunting. Opt-out plans involve enormous complexity, require substantial information on the part of workers, and add to administrative costs, especially if the percentage of payroll involved is fairly small. And they are likely to offer most of their benefits to people with higher incomes. Indeed, the National Association of Pension Funds, the research and lobbying arm of occupational pension funds in the U.K., has recently proposed that policymakers in the U.K. consider separating the roles of a universal public pension and individual account tiers, requiring 
